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Preprints
, 2024, Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2404.05198
, 2023, Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2303.03642
, 2023, Envy-free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2312.11286
, 2023, Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.02931
, 2023, Computational complexity of $k$-stable matchings, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2307.03794
, 2023, Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2208.08782
, 2023, Fair Allocation of Two Types of Chores, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2211.00879
, 2023, Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2206.05966
, 2022, Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2110.09066
, 2022, Task Allocation using a Team of Robots, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2207.09650
, 2022, Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2111.01983
, 2022, Algorithmic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items: A Survey and New Questions, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2202.08713
, 2021, Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.04384
, 2021, The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2008.08991
, 2021, Optimal Kidney Exchange with Immunosuppressants, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2103.02253
, 2020, Approximate and Strategyproof Maximin Share Allocation of Chores with Ordinal Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2012.13884
, 2020, A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1909.00740
, 2020, Participatory Budgeting: Models and Approaches, https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.00606v1
, 2020, A characterization of proportionally representative committees, https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09598v2
, 2020, From Matching with Diversity Constraints to Matching with Regional Quotas, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2002.06748
, 2019, Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences, https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00864v2
, 2019, Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.07993
, 2019, The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1908.00161
, 2019, Weighted Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Indivisible Chores, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1906.07602
, 2019, Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1905.08925
, 2019, Strategyproof Peer Selection using Randomization, Partitioning, and Apportionment, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.03632
, 2018, Fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1807.10684
, 2018, The Temporary Exchange Problem, https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05514v1
, 2018, Efficient Reallocation under Additive and Responsive Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.01091
, 2018, A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints, https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.11437v1
, 2018, Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1803.06644
, 2018, Proportional Representation in Approval-based Committee Voting and Beyond, https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.00882v1
, 2017, Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1712.02542
, 2017, Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1711.08226
, 2017, Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms, https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06030v1
, 2017, Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts, https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.01231v1
, 2017, Fractional Hedonic Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.10116
, 2017, Equilibria in Sequential Allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.09444
, 2017, Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: a Probabilistic Social Choice Function, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.00544
, 2017, A Polynomial-time Algorithm to Achieve Extended Justified Representation, https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10415v1
, 2017, The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1503.06665
, 2017, The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1701.08023
, 2016, Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1609.02795
, 2016, Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1407.8269
, 2016, Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1607.02917
, 2016, Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in the Random Assignment Setting with Indifferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.07540
, 2016, A Discrete and Bounded Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Any Number of Agents, https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.03655v12
, 2016, Approximation Algorithms for Max-Min Share Allocations of Indivisible Chores and Goods, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.01435
, 2016, A Comment on the Averseness of Random Serial Dictatorship to Stochastic Dominance Efficiency, https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07392v2
, 2016, Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences, https://arxiv.org/abs/1603.03073v2