By Scientia Professor Richard Timothy Holden

Preprints

Gans JS; Holden R, 2022, Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2206.10065

Gans JS; Holden R, 2022, Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4141590

Akerlof R; Holden R, 2019, Capital Assembly, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3395052

Holden R; Keane MP; Lilley M, 2019, Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339242

Ferejohn JA; Ginsburg T; Holden R, 2017, Arbitration in Anarchy, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3054808

Holden R; Malani A, 2017, Can Blockchain Solve the Holdup Problem in Contracts?, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093879

Dessein W; Holden R, 2017, Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3024631

Akerlof R; Holden R, 2015, Movers and Shakers, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2649720

Aghion P; Fehr E; Holden R; Wilkening T, 2015, The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2597999

Aghion P; Fehr E; Holden R; Wilkening T, 2015, The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2598911

Gratton G; Holden R; Kolotilin A, 2015, Timing Information Flows, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636122

Ederer F; Holden R; Meyer MA, 2014, Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382630

Ederer F; Holden R; Meyer M, 2013, Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2197597

Holden R; Malani A, 2012, Contracts versus Assets and the Boundary of the Firm, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990550

Gibbons RS; Holden R; Powell ML, 2010, Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574468

Gibbons RS; Holden R; Powell ML, 2010, Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573869

Gibbons RS; Holden R; Powell ML, 2009, Firms in Markets Under Uncertainty, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1446777

Alesina AF; Holden R, 2008, Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1154100

Aghion P; Fudenberg D; Holden R, 2008, Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081588

Akerlof R; Holden R, 2007, The Nature of Tournaments, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1093297

Agastya M; Holden R, 2006, Incentive Compatibility: Everywhere vs. Almost Everywhere, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927403

Friedman JN; Holden R, 2005, The Rising Incumbent Advantage: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do with it?, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.847656

Holden R, 2004, Supermajority Voting Rules, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.625122

Agastya M; Holden R, 2003, Insider Trading, Informational Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.389500

Holden R; Malani A; Teh C, Allocating Scarce Information, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4058511

Holden R; Malani A; Teh C, Allocating Scarce Information, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4056799

Crosby S; Huang L; Jan S; Holden R; Neal B; Malavisi1 A, Factors influencing the time to ethics and governance approvals for clinical trials, http://dx.doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3047964/v1

Akerlof R; Holden R; Li H, Getting the Picture, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4821349

crosby SP; Huang L; Jan S; Holden R; Aksoy Y; Neal B, Speed of ethics and governance approvals in Australia before and after the COVID-19 pandemic: a cross-sectional study, http://dx.doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4197166/v1

Crosby S; Rajadurai E; Jan S; Neal B; Holden R, The effects on clinical trial activity of direct funding and taxation policy interventions made by government: a systematic review, http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/2022.05.13.22275062

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