By Professor Anton Kolotilin

Journal articles

Kolotilin A; Mylovanov T; Zapechelnyuk A, 2022, 'Censorship as optimal persuasion', Theoretical Economics, 17, pp. 561 - 585, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE4071

Kolotilin A; Li H, 2021, 'Relational communication', Theoretical Economics, 16, pp. 1391 - 1430, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE3734

Holden R; Gratton G; Kolotilin A, 2018, 'When to Drop a Bombshell', Review of Economic Studies, 85, pp. 2139 - 2172, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx070

Kolotilin A, 2018, 'Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach', Theoretical Economics, 13, pp. 607 - 635, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE1805

Kolotilin A; Mylovanov T; Zapechelnyuk A; Li M, 2017, 'Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver', Econometrica, 85, pp. 1949 - 1964, http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13251

Gratton G; Kolotilin A, 2015, 'Euclidean fairness and efficiency', Economic Inquiry, 53, pp. 1689 - 1690, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12193

Kolotilin A, 2015, 'Experimental design to persuade', Games and Economic Behavior, 90, pp. 215 - 226, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.006

Berndt ER; Gibbons RS; Kolotilin A; Taub AL, 2015, 'The heterogeneity of concentrated prescribing behavior: Theory and evidence from antipsychotics', Journal of Health Economics, 40, pp. 26 - 39, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.11.003

Kolotilin A; Li H; Li W, 2013, 'Optimal limited authority for principal', Journal of Economic Theory, 148, pp. 2344 - 2382, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.014

Working Papers

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2020, The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering, http://dx.doi.org10.2139/ssrn.3698690

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2020, Assortative Information Disclosure, http://dx.doi.org10.2139/ssrn.3616781

Kolotilin A; Panchenko V, 2018, Estimation of a Scale-Free Network Formation Model, http://dx.doi.org10.2139/ssrn.3202168

Preprints

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2024, Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2402.17142

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, 2023, Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2311.02889

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2023, The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2304.09381

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, 2022, Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2206.09164

Dworczak P; Kolotilin A, 2019, The Persuasion Duality, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1910.11392

Kolotilin A; Zapechelnyuk A, 2019, Persuasion Meets Delegation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1902.02628

Kolotilin A; Mylovanov T; Zapechelnyuk A, Censorship as Optimal Persuasion, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783291

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4739586

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4643091

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, Persuasion as Matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4140246

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4204824

Dworczak P; Kolotilin A, The Persuasion Duality, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4206116

Back to profile page