By Professor Anton Kolotilin

Preprints

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2026, Competitive Many-to-One Matching: Sorting vs. Equality, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2605.30879

Kolotilin A; Li H; Zapechelnyuk A, 2024, On Monotone Persuasion, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2412.14400

Dworczak P; Kolotilin A, 2024, The Persuasion Duality, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1910.11392

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2024, Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2402.17142

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, 2023, Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2311.02889

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, 2023, The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2304.09381

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, 2022, Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2206.09164

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, 2022, Persuasion as Matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4140246

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, 2022, Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4204824

Dworczak P; Kolotilin A, 2022, The Persuasion Duality, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4206116

Kolotilin A; Mylovanov T; Zapechelnyuk A, 2021, Censorship as Optimal Persuasion, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3783291

Kolotilin A; Zapechelnyuk A, 2019, Persuasion Meets Delegation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1902.02628

Kolotilin A; Wolitzky A, Distributions of Posterior Quantiles via Matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4739586

Kolotilin A; Corrao R; Wolitzky A, Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4643091

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