Select Publications
Preprints
2023, Multivariate Majorization in Principal-Agents Models, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2308.13804
,2023, Tropical Analysis: With an Application to Indivisible Goods, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2308.04593
,2023, A Non-Parametric Test of Risk Aversion, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2308.02083
,2023, S Equilibrium: A Synthesis of (Behavioral) Game Theory, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2307.06309
,2023, Yquilibrium: A Theory for (Non-) Convex Economies, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2305.06256
,2022, The Economy's Potential: Duality and Equilibrium, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2210.14437
,2018, M Equilibrium: A theory of beliefs and choices in games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1811.05138
,A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1974922
,An Equilibrium Analysis of the Simultaneous Ascending Auction, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1476837
,An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emissions Allowances Under a Loose Cap, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1427292
,An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1552130
,An Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1476567
,Auction Design for Selling CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2459462
,Collusion in Auctions for Emission Permits: An Experimental Analysis, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1272713
,Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1377523
,Communication and Competition, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2060977
,Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.621521
,Designing Package Markets to Eliminate Exposure Risk, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2047008
,In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.822725
,Inefficient Markets, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2055192
,M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3829622
,On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in a General Class of Social Choice Problems, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1895286
,On the Impossibility of Core-Selecting Auctions, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1506984
,Optimal Market Design, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1562550
,Optimal Privatization using Qualifying Auctions, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.756364
,Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1621849
,Spectrum Auction Design: Simple Auctions for Complex Sales, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2302649
,Stabilizing the Economy: Market Design and General Equilibrium, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2146695
,What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2029598
,Wise Crowds or Wise Minorities?, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1477942
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