Select Publications

Preprints

Aziz H; Luo P; Rizkallah C, 2017, Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: a Probabilistic Social Choice Function, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.00544

Aziz H; Elkind E; Faliszewski P; Lackner M; Skowron P, 2017, The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1701.08023

Aziz H; de Haan R; Rastegari B, 2016, Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1609.02795

Aziz H; Biró P; Gaspers S; de Haan R; Mattei N; Rastegari B, 2016, Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1607.02917

Abeliuk A; Aziz H; Berbeglia G; Gaspers S; Kalina P; Mattei N; Peters D; Stursberg P; Van Hentenryck P; Walsh T, 2016, Interdependent Scheduling Games

Aziz H; Luo P; Rizkallah C, 2016, Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in the Random Assignment Setting with Indifferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.07540

Aziz H; Lev O; Mattei N; Rosenschein JS; Walsh T, 2016, Strategyproof Peer Selection using Randomization, Partitioning, and Apportionment, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.03632

Aziz H; Biro P; Lang J; Lesca J; Monnot J, 2016, Efficient Reallocation under Additive and Responsive Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.01091

Aziz H; Bouveret S; Lang J; Mackenzie S, 2016, Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1602.06940

Aziz H; Harrenstein P; Lang J; Wooldridge M, 2015, Boolean Hedonic Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1509.07062

Aziz H; Chen J; Filos-Ratsikas A; Mackenzie S; Mattei N, 2015, Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1507.06827

Aziz H; Brânzei S; Filos-Ratsikas A; Frederiksen SKS, 2015, The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1503.06665

Aleksandrov M; Aziz H; Gaspers S; Walsh T, 2015, Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1502.07571

Aziz H; Seedig HG; von Wedel JK, 2015, On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1502.06318

Aziz H; Gaspers S; Mackenzie S; Mattei N; Narodytska N; Walsh T, 2015, Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1502.04888

Aziz H; Gaspers S; Mackenzie S; Mattei N; Narodytska N; Walsh T, 2015, Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1501.06626

Aziz H; Cahan C; Gretton C; Kilby P; Mattei N; Walsh T, 2014, A Study of Proxies for Shapley Allocations of Transport Costs, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1408.4901

Aziz H; Brill M; Conitzer V; Elkind E; Freeman R; Walsh T, 2014, Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1407.8269

Aziz H; Gaspers S; Gudmundsson J; Mackenzie S; Mattei N; Walsh T, 2014, Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1407.3247

Aziz H; Gaspers S; Mattei N; Narodytska N; Walsh T, 2014, Strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1401.6523

Aziz H; Bachrach Y; Elkind E; Paterson M, 2014, False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1401.3869

Aziz H; Gaspers S; Mackenzie S; Walsh T, 2013, Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1312.6546

Aziz H; Brill M; Harrenstein P, 2012, Testing Substitutability of Weak Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1201.0432

Aziz H; Brandt F; Seedig HG, 2010, Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1008.0074

Aziz H; Brandt F; Seedig HG, 2010, Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1005.4540

Aziz H; Lachish O; Paterson M; Savani R, 2009, Wiretapping a hidden network, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.0909.5293


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