Select Publications
Preprints
, 2026, Adapting Dijkstra for Buffers and Unlimited Transfers, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2603.11729
, 2026, Fast and Memory Efficient Multimodal Journey Planning with Delays
, 2026, Early Pruning for Public Transport Routing, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2603.12592
, 2025, Playing games with Large language models: Randomness and strategy, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2503.02582
, 2025, Shifting Power: Leveraging LLMs to Simulate Human Aversion in ABMs of Bilateral Financial Exchanges, A bond market study, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2503.00320
, 2025, Evaluating Binary Decision Biases in Large Language Models: Implications for Fair Agent-Based Financial Simulations, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2501.16356
, 2024, Decoding OTC Government Bond Market Liquidity: An ABM Model for Market Dynamics, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2501.16331
, 2024, Timetable Nodes for Public Transport Network, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2410.15715
, 2024, TraderTalk: An LLM Behavioural ABM applied to Simulating Human Bilateral Trading Interactions, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2410.21280
, 2024, Mixed Fair Division: A Survey, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2306.09564
, 2024, Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items under Cost Utilities, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2407.13171
, 2024, Modelling Opaque Bilateral Market Dynamics in Financial Trading: Insights from a Multi-Agent Simulation Study, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2405.02849
, 2024, Non cooperative Liquidity Games and their application to bond market trading, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2405.02865
, 2024, Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2404.05198
, 2023, Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2303.03642
, 2023, Incentives to Offer Algorithmic Recourse, http://arxiv.org/abs/2301.12884v1
, 2022, Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2110.09066
, 2022, Gathering Strength, Gathering Storms: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence (AI100) 2021 Study Panel Report, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2210.15767
, 2022, Manipulation and Peer Mechanisms: A Survey, http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.01984v3
, 2022, What Type of Explanation Do Rejected Job Applicants Want? Implications for Explainable AI, http://arxiv.org/abs/2205.09649v1
, 2021, Partial Queries for Constraint Acquisition, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2003.06649
, 2020, From Matching with Diversity Constraints to Matching with Regional Quotas, http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.06748v1
, 2019, h-Index Manipulation by Undoing Merges, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.04827
, 2019, A Commentary on "Breaking Row and Column Symmetries in Matrix Models", http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1910.01423
, 2018, Fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1807.10684
, 2018, Verifying Properties of Binarized Deep Neural Networks, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1709.06662
, 2017, Equilibria in Sequential Allocation, http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.09444v1
, 2017, The Conference Paper Assignment Problem: Using Order Weighted Averages to Assign Indivisible Goods, http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.06840v1
, 2017, Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence Courses, http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07769v1
, 2016, Justified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1407.8269
, 2016, H-Index Manipulation by Merging Articles: Models, Theory, and Experiments, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1412.5498
, 2016, Empirical Evaluation of Real World Tournaments
, 2016, Strategyproof Peer Selection using Randomization, Partitioning, and Apportionment, http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.03632v4
, 2016, Approximation Algorithms for Max-Min Share Allocations of Indivisible Chores and Goods, http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01435v1
, 2016, Interdependent Scheduling Games.
, 2015, Welfare of Sequential Allocation Mechanisms for Indivisible Goods, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1511.08280
, 2015, Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1509.02424
, 2015, Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1312.6546
, 2015, Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem, http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07571v2
, 2015, Equilibria Under the Probabilistic Serial Rule, http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.04888v2
, 2015, Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule, http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.06626v1
, 2015, Algorithms for two variants of Satisfaction Approval Voting
, 2014, Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1412.2226
, 2014, A Study of Proxies for Shapley Allocations of Transport Costs, http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.4901v1
, 2014, Computational Aspects of Multi-Winner Approval Voting, http://arxiv.org/abs/1407.3247v1
, 2014, The Computational Impact of Partial Votes on Strategic Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1405.7714
, 2014, Strategic aspects of the probabilistic serial rule for the allocation of goods, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1401.6523
, 2013, Breaking Symmetry with Different Orderings, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1306.5053
, 2013, How Hard Is It to Control an Election by Breaking Ties?, http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.6174v2
, 2013, Three Generalizations of the FOCUS Constraint, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1304.5970