By Professor Richard Timothy Holden

Preprints

Alesina AF; Holden R, Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1154100

Holden R; Malani A, Can Blockchain Solve the Holdup Problem in Contracts?, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093879

Akerlof R; Holden R, Capital Assembly, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3395052

Holden R; Malani A, Contracts versus Assets and the Boundary of the Firm, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1990550

Gibbons RS; Holden R; Powell ML, Firms in Markets Under Uncertainty, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1446777

Ederer FP; Holden R; Meyer MA, Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2197597

Ederer F; Holden R; Meyer MA, Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382630

Agastya MK; Holden R, Incentive Compatibility: Everywhere vs. Almost Everywhere, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.927403

Agastya MK; Holden R, Insider Trading, Informational Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.389500

Gibbons RS; Holden R; Powell ML, Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1574468

Akerlof R; Holden R, Movers and Shakers, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2649720

Gibbons RS; Holden R; Powell ML, Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1573869

Aghion P; Fudenberg D; Holden R, Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1081588

Holden R, Supermajority Voting Rules, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.625122

Akerlof R; Holden R, The Nature of Tournaments, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1093297

Friedman JN; Holden R, The Rising Incumbent Advantage: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.847656

Aghion P; Fehr E; Holden R; Wilkening TS, The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation - An Empirical Investigation, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2597999

Aghion P; Fehr E; Holden R; Wilkening TS, The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2598911

Gratton G; Holden R; Kolotilin A, Timing Information Flows, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2636122

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